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∗∗Corresponding author.Restricted Export Flexibility and
Risk Management with Options and Futures
This paper examines the production, export and risk management decisions of a
risk-averse competitive ﬁrm under exchange rate risk. The ﬁrm is export ﬂexible
in allocating its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market after
observing the exchange rate. Export ﬂexibility is restricted by certain minimum
sales requirements that are due to long-term considerations. Currency options are
suﬃcient to derive a separation result under restricted export ﬂexibility. Under
fairly priced currency futures and options, full hedging with both instruments is
optimal. Introducing fairly-priced currency options stimulates production provided
that the currency futures market is unbiased.
JEL classiﬁcation: F31; D21; D81
Keywords: restricted export ﬂexibility; risk management; currency futures; currency
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1 Introduction
Foreign exchange rate ﬂuctuations became a major source of risk for international ﬁrms
since the Bretton Woods Agreement collapsed in 1973. Consequently, these ﬁrms have
been using various hedging strategies to cope with the adverse eﬀects of exchange rate
risk on their proﬁts.1 On the one hand, international ﬁrms can adopt a real hedge by
following a ﬂexible sales or input/output policy which allows them to alter their operations
according to realized exchange rates. On the other hand, these ﬁrms can rely on a ﬁnancial
hedging strategy which is typically based on currency derivatives such as currency futures
and options. In any case, there is a close link between the hedging activities in the
markets for goods and services and the ﬁnancial hedging measures. This paper analyzes
the interaction between the ﬁrm’s real and ﬁnancial risk management decisions in the
1In a survey conducted by Rawls and Smithson (1990), foreign exchange risk management is indicated
by ﬁnancial managers to be among their primary objectives.
1context of a competitive exporting ﬁrm. In addition, the paper provides a particularly
simple framework in which the joint use of currency futures and options is optimal.
In the literature on the competitive exporting ﬁrm under exchange rate risk, it is
typically assumed that the risk-averse ﬁrm makes its production and export decision prior
to the resolution of exchange rate uncertainty (see, e.g., Benninga et al. (1985), Kawai
and Zilcha (1986) and Adam-M¨ uller (1997, 2000). In this case, the ﬁrm is inﬂexible
since it cannot react on the realized exchange rate. Its proﬁts are linear in the exchange
rate. Consequently, the existence of currency futures is suﬃcient to derive a separation
theorem which states that the ﬁrm’s production decision is independent of its attitude
towards risk and the exchange rate distribution. In an unbiased currency futures market,
the ﬁrm completely eliminates exchange rate risk by holding a full hedge position. As
shown by Lapan et al. (1991) and Battermann et al. (2000), fairly priced currency options
play no role for an inﬂexible ﬁrm.
In an alternative approach, the ﬁrm is allowed to decide whether to export or not af-
ter observing the exchange rate. This approach, originally proposed by Ware and Winter
(1988), has been further developed by Broll and Wahl (1997) in a rigorous formal model.
While production takes place prior to the resolution of uncertainty, the ﬁrm makes its
export decision (i.e. sales allocation between the domestic market and a foreign market)
after the resolution of uncertainty.2 Hence, the ﬁrm is fully ﬂexible in exporting or re-
fraining from exports. Proﬁts of a fully export ﬂexible ﬁrm are piecewise linear in the
exchange rate with zero slope for low exchange rate realizations. The existence of currency
call options is suﬃcient to derive the separation result. Fairly priced call options are the
only hedging instrument used. The existence of unbiased currency futures is irrelevant.
The ﬁrst class of models can explain the use of currency futures, the second can
explain the use of currency options. But exporting ﬁrms typically employ various types
of derivatives for managing their exchange rate risk (see, e.g., Bodnar and Gebhardt
1999). Thus, models in which an exporting ﬁrm relies exclusively on currency futures or
2Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1992) argue that international transactions are better described by such a
sequence of moves. This is supported by the empirical evidence in Magee (1974).
2exclusively on currency options might seem unsatisfactory. Our model extends the work
of Broll and Wahl (1997) in a way that provides a rationale for the joint use of currency
futures and options. This is done by restricting the ﬁrm’s export ﬂexibility.
Under restricted export ﬂexibility, the ﬁrm has to maintain certain minimum levels
of domestic sales and exports such that the degree of ﬂexibility enjoyed by the ﬁrm
varies inversely with the tightness of these minimum levels. The reason for assuming
the existence of such minimum levels of domestic sales and exports is the observation
that ﬁrms typically have explicit or implicit obligations to remain present in a market
even under (temporarily) unfavorable conditions. These obligations may either be due to
already signed contracts with customers or be simply due to the necessity to maintain
a minimum level of activity in a market in order to remain visible to future customers.3
This minimum level of activity is the result of a longer-term consideration in which market
exit and entry costs determine whether a ﬁrm is currently in the market with at least the
minimum level of activity or whether the ﬁrm is not in the market at all. However, it is
not the purpose of this paper to analyze this longer-term market entry decision. Instead,
it is taken as given that market entry and exit costs are such that it is currently optimal
for the ﬁrm to be present in the domestic and the export markets for longer-term reasons
even if this market presence is not necessarily favorable in the period of time considered
in this paper.
Given restricted export ﬂexibility, the ﬁrm’s optimal sales allocation rule is state con-
tingent: It exports more than the minimum level to the foreign market when the realized
exchange rate is suﬃciently favorable such that the foreign price (measured in units of the
domestic currency) exceeds the domestic price; otherwise, it maintains the minimum level
of exports and sells the rest in the domestic market. Alternatively put, exports are like a
real option with a strike price equal to the domestic price. The sales allocation between
the domestic and foreign markets provides the ﬁrm an implicit real hedge against adverse
3Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Bagwell (1991) show that export subsidies facilitate the entry of
high-quality ﬁrms under asymmetric information. Shy (2000) goes one step further and argues that the
decision to export is chosen to signal product quality, despite the fact that exporting is dominated by
non-exporting under symmetric information.
3exchange rate changes.
It will be shown that the separation theorem can be derived even in the absence
of currency futures. If currency futures and options are fairly priced, it is optimal to
fully hedge with a portfolio that consists of both currency futures and options. The
joint use of these derivatives is due to the fact that the restricted export ﬂexible ﬁrm’s
exposure is piecewise linear in the exchange rate with strictly positive slope everywhere.
In addition, the paper analyzes optimal production and risk management decisions when
there are no currency options available. It is also shown that making fairly-priced currency
options available to the ﬁrm enhances production provided the currency futures market
is unbiased.
The argument for the joint use of currency futures and options proposed in this paper
has the advantage of being particularly simple since it relies on a one-period model with
one single source of risk. Other models explaining the joint use of futures and options are
much more complex since they either require the existence of several sources of risk as in
Lapan et al. (1991), Lapan and Moschini (1994), Moschini and Lapan (1995), Broll et al.
(2001), Frechette (2001) and Mahul (2002) or a multi-period framework as in Lence et al.
(1994).
The model which comes closest to the spirit of ours is the model of Moschini and
Lapan (1992) who analyze a competitive ﬁrm with production ﬂexibility under output
price uncertainty. In their model, there are two types of inputs. The decision on the use of
quasi-ﬁxed inputs has to be made before price uncertainty is resolved whereas the decision
on other inputs can be made under certainty. Hence, this ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility is restricted
by the obligation to decide on the level of quasi-ﬁxed inputs before price uncertainty is
resolved. Moschini and Lapan (1992) show that the optimal hedging portfolio consists
of both futures and options if the proﬁt function is quadratic and the price distribution
is symmetric. In contrast to their model of restricted production ﬂexibility, we analyze
restricted export ﬂexibility without imposing a similar symmetry requirement on the
distribution. However, the proﬁt function analyzed by Moschini and Lapan (1992) is
4more general than ours. In both models, the joint use of futures and options is optimal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the ﬁrm’s optimal production and risk management decisions when both currency
futures and options are available. Section 4 derives the ﬁrm’s optimal production and risk
management decisions when there are currency futures only. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a risk-averse competitive ﬁrm which produces a single commodity Q. The cost
function is c(Q), where c(0) ≥ 0, c0(Q) > 0 and c00(Q) > 0. The ﬁrm supplies its entire
output to two markets: the domestic and a foreign market. The per-unit price in the
domestic market, Pd, is denominated in domestic currency. The per-unit price in the
foreign market, Pf, is denominated in foreign currency. Pd and Pf are ﬁxed and known
to the ﬁrm. Due to the segmentation of the domestic and the foreign market, commodity
arbitrage is unproﬁtable so that the law of one price does not necessarily hold.
At date 0, when the ﬁrm makes its production decision, it does not know the exchange
rate (in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). The exchange rate,
denoted by ˜ S4, is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function, G(S), over
support [S,S], where 0 ≤ S < S < ∞. Prior to making its export decision at date 1, i.e.
before the sales allocation between the domestic and foreign market, the ﬁrm observes
the realization of the exchange rate. For high exchange rate realizations, it is attractive
to export since the domestic currency value of the ﬁrm’s foreign exchange revenue is also
high. In contrast, for low exchange rate realizations, the ﬁrm will sell on the domestic
market. Hence, the sales allocation decision at date 1 depends on the realization of the
exchange rate. In this sense, the ﬁrm is export ﬂexible. The possibility to export can thus
be regarded as a real option held by the ﬁrm. This option is exercised if the exchange
rate is suﬃciently high. The time structure is summarized in Figure 1.
4Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
5date 0 date 1
The ﬁrm makes its
production and risk
management decisions.
The ﬁrm observes the
exchange rate.
The ﬁrm makes its
export decision and
realizes proﬁts.
Figure 1: Time line
However, it seems realistic that export ﬂexibility is restricted to some extent. Due to
various explicit and implicit obligations, the ﬁrm has to maintain certain minimum levels
of domestic sales and exports. These quantities are exogenously given and are denoted by
Qd for the domestic market and by Qf for the foreign market. Thus, the ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility
only applies to the amount of output which exceeds the sum of these minimum levels of
domestic sales and exports, i.e. restricted ﬂexibility only applies to Q − Qd − Qf > 0.
Given an exchange rate realization S and the ﬁrm’s restricted export ﬂexibility, its
optimal decision on the allocation of output between the domestic and foreign markets is
as follows: If SPf > Pd, the domestic currency revenue from exporting is higher than that
from selling in the domestic market. Hence, the ﬁrm exercises its real option and exports
as much as possible to the foreign market, Q−Qd, while still meeting the minimum level of
domestic sales, Qd. For SPf ≤ Pd, the ﬁrm maintains only the minimum level of exports,
Qf, and sells the rest, Q − Qf, in the domestic market. It is assumed that there is at
least some probability mass for realizations of ˜ S below Pd/Pf and at least some mass for
realizations above this value, S < Pd/Pf < S.






SPfQf + Pd(Q − Qf) if SPf ≤ Pd,
SPf(Q − Qd) + PdQd if SPf > Pd.
(1)
Writing the above equation in a compact way yields
˜ R = ˜ SPfQf + Pd(Q − Qf) + Pf max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)(Q − Qd − Qf). (2)
It is evident from the last summand in equation (2) that there are options embedded in the
6ﬁrm’s domestic currency revenue. Figure 2 illustrates this graphically. The steeper thick
line represents the ﬁrm’s domestic currency revenue if it exports Q − Qd to the foreign
market. The slope is Pf(Q − Qd). The ﬂatter thick line represents the ﬁrm’s domestic
currency revenue if the ﬁrm exports only the minimum level, Qf, to the foreign market.
Here, the slope is only PfQf. Since the ﬁrm is export ﬂexible, it will always choose a
sales allocation between the domestic and the foreign market that maximizes its domestic
currency revenue. In Figure 2, the domestic currency revenue is represented by the solid
part of the two thick lines, which is convex in S and piecewise linear with positive slope
everywhere. This convexity is created by the possibility to export. Inspection of equation




































Figure 2: Total and marginal revenue in domestic currency
The thin dashed line in Figure 2 represents the dependence of the ﬁrm’s marginal
revenue ∂R/∂Q on the exchange rate S. For exchange rates below Pd/Pf, any additional
unit of output that exceeds (Qd + Qf) is sold in the domestic market. Hence, marginal
7revenue is unaﬀected by the exchange rate. For exchange rates above this level, additional
output is exported such that the domestic currency value of marginal revenue linearly
increases in the exchange rate with slope Pf.
To hedge its exchange rate risk exposure, the ﬁrm can trade currency futures as well
as currency call and put options on the delivery of the domestic currency per unit of
the foreign currency. Of course, the ﬁrm makes its risk management decision at date 0,
i.e. before the realized exchange rate is known. Since the payoﬀs of any combination
of futures, call options and put options can be replicated by any two of these three
ﬁnancial instruments using put-call parity (see, e.g., Sercu and Uppal, 1995), one of them
is redundant. Without loss of generality, we restrict the ﬁrm to use currency futures and
currency call options. Let F be the futures price and H be the number of currency futures
sold by the ﬁrm. In addition, let C denote the premium of a call option with strike price
K and Z denote the number of currency call options written by the ﬁrm. For simplicity,
K is chosen to be equal to Pd/Pf.5 The currency derivatives markets are competitive
such that F and C are not aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s positions in these markets.
Taking the optimal sales allocation rule described above as given, the ﬁrm’s domestic
currency proﬁts at date 1, denoted by ˜ Π, can be written as6
˜ Π = ˜ R + (F − ˜ S)H +
h
C − max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)
i
Z − c(Q), (3)
where ˜ R is deﬁned in equation (2). The ﬁrm’s decision problem at date 0 is to choose an
output level, Q, and a hedge portfolio, (H,Z), so as to maximize the expected utility of







where E[·] is the expectation operator, ˜ Π is deﬁned in equation (3) and U(Π) is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function deﬁned over the ﬁrm’s domestic currency proﬁts.
The ﬁrm is risk averse, U0(Π) > 0 and U00(Π) < 0.
5In practice, it is relatively easy to trade in currency options with any strike price since the majority
of currency options is traded in the over-the-counter markets where products are not standardized.
6For simplicity, we assume an interest rate of zero such that costs c(Q) can simply be subtracted at
date 1.

























C − max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)
i
= 0, (7)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level. The second-order conditions for the
unique maximum, (Q∗,H∗,Z∗), are satisﬁed given risk aversion and the convexity of the
cost function. For ease of exposition, Qd, Qf, the distribution of ˜ S and the cost function
are assumed to be such that the ﬁrm possesses some degree of export ﬂexibility at the
optimum, Q∗ > Qd + Qf.7
3 Optimal production and risk management
with futures and options
This section characterizes the ﬁrm’s optimal production and risk management decisions
on the premise that the ﬁrm can trade both currency futures and currency call options.
First, examine the ﬁrm’s optimal production decision. Rewriting condition (7) as












Since U0(Π) > 0 for all Π, equation (8) implies c0(Q∗) = Pd + PfC. Thus, the following
separation result is established.
7The case where Q∗ < Qd + Qf is a completely diﬀerent problem from an economic point of view. In
order to exclude this case, the condition that Q∗ ≥ Qd + Qf had to be considered in the optimization
problem. Hence, assuming the existence of some ﬂexibility in the optimum only avoids lengthy discussions
of Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the corner solution (Q∗ = Qd + Qf) which is of no interest since there is
no ﬂexibility at all.
9Proposition 1 (Separation) When currency call options8 with strike price Pd/Pf are
available, the restricted export ﬂexible ﬁrm’s optimal output, Q∗, is implicitly given by
c0(Q∗) = Pd + PfC. Thus, Q∗ depends neither on the preferences of the ﬁrm nor on the
distribution of the exchange rate.
Since the derivation of c0(Q∗) = Pd + PfC does not involve equation (6), i.e. the use
of currency futures, the above separation result holds even when H ≡ 0. The intuition
behind Proposition 1 can be explained using the thin dashed line in Figure 2 which exhibits
the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue with respect to the exchange rate as given by Pd+Pf max(˜ S−
Pd/Pf,0). Since the shape of this function exactly mirrors the shape of the call option’s
payoﬀ (plus a constant), call options with strike price Pd/Pf span the ﬁrm’s exchange rate
exposure. Thus, the production decision is based on the market price for this exposure
as given by the call premium C. The optimal production decision is to equate marginal
costs with deterministic marginal revenue. If the condition of Proposition 1 is violated,
the ﬁrm can make a riskless proﬁt. If, for example, output is less than Q∗, then increasing
output and selling the associated exchange rate exposure by writing a call option on Pf
units of foreign currency results in a deterministic proﬁt of Pd +PfC −c0(Q) > 0. Hence,
the degree of risk aversion and the distribution of the exchange rate cannot aﬀect the
optimal production decision.
A natural question to ask in the context of restricted export ﬂexibility is whether the
tightness of the restrictions aﬀects the ﬁrm’s optimal output. The following statement is
a direct consequence of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 When currency call options with strike price Pd/Pf are available, the re-
stricted export ﬂexible ﬁrm’s optimal output, Q∗, is not aﬀected by the tightness of the
restrictions arising from Qd and Qf.
This result is a direct implication of the optimality condition, c0(Q∗) = Pd + PfC,
which is unaﬀected by Qd and Qf. Since marginal revenue is independent of Qd and Qf,
8Due to put-call parity, the availability of currency futures and put options yields the same result.
10the optimal production is unaﬀected by these restrictions as well. Hence, the optimal
output is the same irrespective of whether the ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility is restricted or not. This
is due to the fact that marginal revenue with respect to the exchange rate is independent
of the restrictions. That is why Broll and Wahl (1997) derive an equivalent result for a
fully ﬂexible ﬁrm. In contrast to the production decision, the optimal hedge portfolio,
(H∗,Z∗), depends on the restrictions as will become clear later.
Proposition 1 states that the distribution of the exchange rate does not aﬀect optimal
production. This statement, however, has to be interpreted with care since it only holds
for a given call option premium C. As is well-known from the option pricing literature,
an increase in the volatility of the exchange rate makes currency options more valuable
(see, e.g., Sercu and Uppal, 1995). Thus, it will result in an increase in the call option
premium C. Then, c0(Q∗) = Pd + PfC and the convexity of the cost function imply that
the ﬁrm’s optimal output increases in C and, hence, in the volatility of the exchange rate.
This is summarized in the following statement.
Corollary 2 When currency call options with strike price Pd/Pf are available, the re-
stricted export ﬂexible ﬁrm’s optimal output, Q∗, increases in the call option premium
C which in turn increases in the volatility of the exchange rate. It follows that the ﬁrm
produces more as the exchange rate becomes more volatile.
An immediate implication of Corollary 2 is that export volume and exchange rate
volatility should be positively related in countries where export ﬂexibility prevails.9
We now turn to the question of how the ﬁrm’s optimal production decision is aﬀected
by the existence of export ﬂexibility. As shown by Benninga et al. (1985), Kawai and
Zilcha (1986) and others, the optimal output of an export-inﬂexible ﬁrm, Q∗
inﬂex, which
is obliged to export its entire output is implicitly given by c0(Q∗
inﬂex) = FPf. Comparing
this optimality condition and the one given in Proposition 1 yields c0(Q∗
inﬂex) = FPf <
9Together with the theoretical results of Franke (1991), Dellas and Zilberfarb (1993) and Broll and
Eckwert (1999), Corollary 2 might therefore explain the positive empirical relation between exchange
rate volatility and the volume of international trade found in a number of studies that are surveyed by
McKenzie (1999).
11Pd + PfC = c0(Q∗). The inequality follows directly from put-call parity.10 Then, the
convexity of the cost function implies Q∗
inﬂex < Q∗. This proves the next corollary.
Corollary 3 When currency call options with strike price Pd/Pf are available, the (re-
stricted) export ﬂexible ﬁrm’s optimal output is higher than that of an otherwise identical
exporting ﬁrm which possesses no export ﬂexibility.
The opportunity to refrain from exporting at low realizations of the exchange rate
stimulates the export ﬂexible ﬁrm to produce more. Export ﬂexibility creates additional
value for the ﬁrm which could be sold in the currency call options market at a positive
price per unit of potential exports. This creates a wedge between the marginal cost of a
ﬂexible ﬁrm and that of an inﬂexible ﬁrm as shown above.
Now, turn to the ﬁrm’s optimal risk management decision. Suppose that the currency
futures and options markets are jointly unbiased: F = E[˜ S] and C = E[max(˜ S−Pd/Pf,0)].
Joint unbiasedness implies that the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts are unaﬀected by its positions
in the currency futures and options markets. Using the covariance operator, Cov[·], con-












∗),max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)
i
= 0. (10)
Rewrite the ﬁrm’s proﬁts as
Π = ˜ S[PfQf − H] + max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)[Pf(Q − Qd − Qf) − Z] + J (11)
where J = CZ+FH+Pd(Q−Qf)−c(Q). Substituting H = PfQf and Z = Pf(Q−Qd−
Qf) into equation (11) yields Π = J, which is non-stochastic. Inspection of conditions
(9) and (10) reveals that these two equations hold simultaneously at these values of H
and Z since U0(·) is constant if Π is deterministic, which in turn implies zero covariances.
10By put-call parity, the premium of a put option with strike price Pd/Pf must equal C plus Pd/Pf
minus F, where the option premiums are compounded to date 1. Since the put option premium is
positive, C + Pd/Pf > F.
12Due to the uniqueness of the optimum, the ﬁrm’s optimal hedge portfolio is indeed given
by H∗ = PfQf and Z∗ = Pf(Q∗ − Qd − Qf). This hedge portfolio makes the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts riskless but does not change its expected value, given the joint unbiasedness of the
currency futures and options markets. Hence, this portfolio is optimal. This establishes
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Full hedging) Suppose that the currency futures and options markets
are jointly unbiased. The restricted export ﬂexible ﬁrm’s optimal hedge position, (H∗,Z∗),
satisﬁes H∗ = PfQf and Z∗ = Pf(Q∗ − Qd − Qf).
The optimal futures position is aimed at hedging the exchange rate exposure created by
selling the minimum level Qf in the export market against foreign currency. As is obvious,
the minimum sales requirement for the export market directly aﬀects the optimal futures
position.
The optimal call option position, on the other hand, is used to hedge the conditional
exchange rate exposure created by export ﬂexibility. The existence of additional foreign
exchange revenue of Pf(Q∗ − Qd − Qf) is conditional on the exchange rate exceeding
Pd/Pf. By writing call options on this amount with strike price Pd/Pf, the ﬁrm creates
a conditional obligation to deliver foreign exchange. Since the ﬁrm becomes less export
ﬂexible the higher the minimum levels of domestic sales and exports, Qd and Qf, the
optimal call option position declines in these parameters.
The ﬁrm’s net foreign currency position sums up to zero. For exchange rate realizations
below Pd/Pf, the call options are not exercised and the optimal futures position provides a
full hedge for the export revenue of PfQf. For exchange rate realizations above Pd/Pf, the
call options are exercised. In both cases, the ﬁrm has to deliver its entire foreign exchange
revenue in order to satisfy the obligations from the hedge portfolio (H∗,Z∗). Therefore,
the optimal portfolio of futures and call option positions makes the ﬁrm’s proﬁts invariant
to diﬀerent realizations of the exchange rate (full hedging). These hedging mechanics are



































Figure 3: Hedged and unhedged proﬁts with futures and options
If there is no export ﬂexibility, the ﬁrm’s revenue is linear in the exchange rate. This
is represented by the dashed line and its solid continuation in Figure 3. In this case,
unbiased currency futures are the preferred hedging instrument since they are also linear
in the exchange rate. As shown by Battermann et al. (2000), fairly-priced options will
not be used by an inﬂexible ﬁrm.
On the other hand, a fully ﬂexible ﬁrm will entirely rely on fairly priced currency call
options. Broll and Wahl (1997) have shown that full hedging with call options eliminates
exchange rate risk. This is due to the fact that revenue is piecewise linear in the exchange
rate with a zero slope for low exchange rate realizations. It follows that a risk averse and
fully ﬂexible ﬁrm will never use unbiased currency futures since this would increase risk
while leaving expected proﬁts unchanged.
Restricted export ﬂexibility allows the ﬁrm to implicitly hedge against its exchange
rate risk exposure by the sales allocation between the domestic and foreign markets.
14Speciﬁcally, for realizations of ˜ S below Pd/Pf, the ﬁrm optimally allocates less, but still
some, output to the foreign market and more output to the domestic market. This is
illustrated in Figure 3 by bending up the dashed line at Pd/Pf. This implicit real hedge
has two consequences on the ﬁrm’s unhedged domestic currency proﬁts. First, unhedged
proﬁts are less volatile. Second, unhedged proﬁts become convex in the exchange rate with
strictly positive slope everywhere. The convexity requires the use of currency options,
similar to the case of a fully ﬂexible ﬁrm. Due to the minimum export level, the slope is
positive even at low realizations of ˜ S. This requires the use of currency futures in addition
to currency options. This is not the case for a fully ﬂexible ﬁrm.
Loosely speaking, adding some export ﬂexibility to the inﬂexible ﬁrm results in adding
currency options to the hedging position which consisted of currency futures only. Alter-
natively, restricting a fully ﬂexible ﬁrm to some extent results in adding currency futures
to the hedging position which consisted of currency options. Hence, the restricted export
ﬂexible ﬁrm has two appealing characteristics: First, it seems to be more realistic than
totally inﬂexible or fully ﬂexible ﬁrms. Second, it optimally uses a portfolio of currency
futures and currency options which coincides with observable risk management behavior.
4 Optimal production and risk management
with futures
This section analyzes the ﬁrm’s optimal production and risk management decisions under
the assumption that currency futures are the only hedging instrument available to the
ﬁrm. Since currency options are absent, this section applies to export markets in countries
where currency derivatives markets just begin to develop. Currency futures, because of
their relatively simple structure, are readily available but currency options are not.
The absence of currency call options implies Z = 0 in equation (3). Furthermore,
condition (7) is irrelevant. Let Π, Q and H denote the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and the decisions



















)(F − ˜ S)
i
= 0, (13)
where an asterisk (∗) again indicates an optimal level. The second-order conditions for
the unique maximum, (Q∗
,H∗
), are satisﬁed given risk aversion and the convexity of the
cost function. It is still assumed that Q∗
 > Qf + Qd so that the ﬁrm has some degree of
export ﬂexibility at the optimum.
















Inspection of condition (14) reveals that, in general, the ﬁrm’s optimal output, Q∗
, de-
pends on the ﬁrm’s attitude toward risk and on the nature of the underlying exchange
rate uncertainty. This implies the following result.
Proposition 3 If currency futures are the only hedging instrument available to the re-
stricted export ﬂexible ﬁrm, its optimal output, Q∗
, is neither separable from the ﬁrm’s
attitude toward risk nor from the distribution of the exchange rate.
Since the available currency derivatives do not allow for complete elimination of ex-
change rate risk from marginal revenue, the ﬁrm’s willingness to assume risk and the
characteristics of the exchange rate distribution have an adverse impact on the ﬁrm’s
optimal production decision.
Now, the ﬁrm’s optimal futures position is characterized. If the currency futures









Based on condition (15), the following proposition can be established where a proof is
given in Appendix A.
16Proposition 4 Suppose that the restricted export ﬂexible ﬁrm can trade unbiased cur-
rency futures only. Then, its optimal futures position, H∗
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Figure 4: Hedged and unhedged proﬁts with futures only
Proposition 4 can be illustrated using Figure 4. Without hedging, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts
are piecewise linear and convex in the exchange rate. However, currency futures only
allow for hedging against a linear exposure. For S > Pd/Pf, the optimal export policy is
to export as much as possible which generates foreign currency revenue of Pf(Q − Qd).
This is the steeper part of the unhedged proﬁts line in the north-east of Figure 4. Setting
H = Pf(Q − Qd), the ﬁrm could eliminate exchange rate risk for high exchange rate
realizations, S > Pd/Pf. For lower realizations, S < Pd/Pf, export revenue only amounts
to PfQf. For these realizations, exchange rate risk can be eliminated by setting H =
PfQf. This shows that there is a conﬂict between hedging exchange rate risk for high
and for low realizations of the exchange rate. Proposition 4 states that the ﬁrm prefers a
17compromise between these two futures positions. The dependence of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts on
the exchange rate, given the optimal futures position, is depicted by the V-shaped line in
Figure 4.
Proposition 4 shows that the interval containing H∗
 narrows if either Qd or Qf in-
creases. Tightening the restrictions on the ﬁrm’s export ﬂexibility means that the con-
vexity of unhedged proﬁts in Figure 4 becomes smaller. This reduces the conﬂict between
hedging for high and hedging for low exchange rate realizations. In the limit, for a ﬁrm
without any export ﬂexibility, the interval degenerates and the convexity of unhedged
proﬁts disappears. Then, the optimal futures position is unequivocally determined and
the present model reduces to the classical model of an inﬂexible exporting ﬁrm as analyzed
by Benninga et al. (1985) and others.
Finally, it is of interest to compare Q∗ and Q∗
 in order to ﬁnd out whether introducing
fairly-priced currency options to the ﬁrm stimulates production, thereby expected exports
and expected domestic sales. Using the above notation for an unbiased currency option,















Comparing condition (16) with the optimality condition in Proposition 1, c0(Q∗) =
Pd + PfC, yields c0(Q∗) > c0(Q∗
) if and only if the covariance term in equation (16)
is negative. It then follows from the convexity of the cost function that Q∗ > Q∗
. Signing
the covariance in equation (16) requires some tedious algebra. As the following proposi-
tion indicates, this covariance term is indeed negative if the currency futures and options
markets are jointly unbiased. A proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the currency futures and options markets are jointly unbi-
ased. Then, making currency options with strike price Pd/Pf available to the ﬁrm en-
hances production.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Introducing fairly-priced currency options
allows the ﬁrm to sell the risk associated with the option to export without altering its
18expected proﬁts. As shown in Proposition 2, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to eliminate all
exchange rate risk if the two currency derivative markets are jointly unbiased, i.e. when full
hedging is costless in terms of expected proﬁts. Proposition 5 compares two situations
with identical expected marginal revenue. In the ﬁrst situation, characterized by the
absence of an unbiased currency options market, marginal revenue is risky. In the second,
with jointly unbiased currency futures and options markets, marginal revenue is riskless
at the optimum. It follows that a risk-averse ﬁrm produces more under riskless marginal
revenue than under risky marginal revenue.
5 Conclusions
Foreign exchange risk management and its interaction with real operations play a sig-
niﬁcant role for an international ﬁrm’s success. This paper has examined the optimal
production and risk management decisions of an export ﬂexible ﬁrm under exchange rate
uncertainty. The paper focuses on restrictions of export ﬂexibility in that the ﬁrm is
assumed to serve both the domestic market and a foreign market with certain minimum
levels of domestic sales and exports. The separation theorem requires the existence of
currency call options only. Optimal production is unaﬀected by the tightness of the re-
strictions of the ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility. The optimal hedge portfolio eliminates all exchange rate
risk if the currency derivatives markets are jointly unbiased. The hedge portfolio consists
of both currency futures and currency options. Hence, our simple model of a restricted
export ﬂexible ﬁrm is suﬃciently rich to provide a rationale for the joint use of currency
futures and options in exchange rate risk management. In contrast to the production
decision, the structure of the optimal hedge portfolio directly depends on how severe the
restrictions are.
In the absence of currency options, neither separation nor full hedging can be derived.
Since currency futures do not allow for complete elimination of the ﬁrm’s piecewise linear
exchange rate risk, the ﬁrm has to bear some exchange rate risk whatever its futures
position will be. In this case, it is clear that preferences and the assessment of the
19exchange rate distribution aﬀect the ﬁrm’s optimal production and risk management
decisions. Making fairly priced currency options available to the ﬁrm has a positive eﬀect
on production and, consequently, on expected exports and expected domestic sales if the
currency futures market is unbiased.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 4
Partially diﬀerentiating the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, Π, as given in equation (3) with Z = 0, with
respect to S yields11
∂Π
∂S
= PfQf − H +
∂
∂S
max(S − Pd/Pf,0)Pf(Q − Qd − Qf). (17)
The remainder of the proof is by contradiction. Inspection of equation (17) reveals that
∂Π/∂S ≤ 0 if Pf(Q − Qd) ≤ H. Given risk aversion and Pf(Q − Qd) ≤ H, U0(Π)
is non-decreasing in S for S > Pd/Pf and strictly increasing for S ≤ Pd/Pf. Hence,




Likewise, equation (17) implies ∂Π/∂S ≥ 0 if PfQf ≥ H. Thus, given PfQf ≥ H,
U0(Π) is non-increasing in S for S ≤ Pd/Pf and decreasing in S for S > Pd/Pf such that
the covariance in equation (15) is negative. Hence, (15) implies H∗
 > PfQf. 2
B. Proof of Proposition 5
We have to show that Cov[U0(˜ Π∗
),max(˜ S−Pd/Pf,0)] is negative. Partially diﬀerentiating
Π∗
 with respect to S, given the optimal futures position H∗










 < 0 for S < Pd/Pf,
Pf(Q∗
 − Qd) − H∗
 > 0 for S > Pd/Pf.
11Π is continuous at S = Pd/Pf but not diﬀerentiable.
12Like Π, Π∗
 is continuous at S = Pd/Pf but not diﬀerentiable.
20Therefore, Π∗
 attains a unique minimum at S = Pd/Pf. (See Figure 4.) Since U00(·) < 0,
U0(Π∗
) reaches a unique maximum at S = Pd/Pf. Thus, there exists a unique ˆ S > Pd/Pf
deﬁned by U0(Π∗
(ˆ S)) = E[U0(Π∗




First, consider case (a), deﬁned by E[U0(˜ Π∗




, where E[·|·] is the conditional expectation operator. By the deﬁnition of the
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where the inequality follows from the fact that {U0(Π∗
(S))−E[U0(˜ Π∗
)]} and (S−Pd/Pf)−
(ˆ S − Pd/Pf) = (S − ˆ S) have opposite signs for all S > Pd/Pf. The curly bracketed
term in the last line is non-positive by assumption. Since (ˆ S − Pd/Pf), G(Pd/Pf) and
[1 − G(Pd/Pf)] are all positive, Cov[U0(˜ Π∗
),max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)] is negative for case (a).
Now, consider case (b), in which E[U0(˜ Π∗




. Since the covariance operator is linear, equation (15) implies Cov[U0(˜ Π∗
), ˜ S] =
Cov[U0(˜ Π∗
), ˜ S − Pd/Pf] = 0. Using the fact that (S − Pd/Pf) = max(S − Pd/Pf,0) −
max(Pd/Pf − S,0) and the linearity again results in Cov[U0(˜ Π∗
),max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)] =
Cov[U0(˜ Π∗
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 ˜ S ≥ Pd/Pf
i)
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that {U0(Π∗
(S)) − E[U0(˜ Π∗
)]} and (Pd/Pf −
S) − (Pd/Pf − S#) = (S# − S) have opposite signs for all S < Pd/Pf. Since the curly
bracketed term in the last line is negative by assumption and (Pd/Pf − S#) is positive,
Cov[U0(˜ Π∗
),max(˜ S − Pd/Pf,0)] is negative for case (b) as well. 2
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